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    NT的密碼究竟放在哪

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    發(fā)表于 2011-1-12 21:01:17 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
    根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100: d% j5 r8 F) V9 @" C! t$ t/ X

    - N8 D, ^3 M5 NFrom: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>" R  y+ U6 F- y* L
    # t5 I! c) Y9 R: ]" U$ C
    To: sans@clark.net
    1 U/ L4 {3 m# R9 |Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
    7 J0 u4 v4 [+ R3 }& Z# Q3 AHi all,6 R( }. v6 G8 X5 o6 U/ w
    We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
    + J2 Z2 m( x. x( ethe system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.* q. U% W, n3 E* h: O
    IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can1 x; `* ^) E  [' W# i
    be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
    7 b1 z& ]# [0 i/ y( XKeys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
    ; r+ n0 K9 v1 m3 ^! k- X0 {2 C- cC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
    5 g' T" w6 N" q+ G" qThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:% b$ Y6 O1 ^& ~  q4 B  V% p
    - IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the) P3 u  x, E0 Q
    MMC)
    # m% O1 I* }( p9 w- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
    , z5 q& ^% ~5 Y- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of* Y( h  L# R3 s. O1 Y  A& @# `
    your virtual directories is located there.
    9 z: j3 p. z! ]- x, B- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
      l7 Y8 ]0 x- b"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
    , A3 {* D4 W# H2 p* U8 [Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
    % `4 I# r" F, {' \1 }2 d! `! E: s5 Osrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
    ' P, m* g* [# ahave permissions on this file.6 n( a. k7 j: U9 L( C
    BUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print, ^, P0 N/ t% N, q6 r+ `
    these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.0 j" ^' H8 \3 ?* O& B
    The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a3 L9 U  |7 P& L* t
    malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server." n+ P0 l1 x! M) o  m( I
    Obviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow! x& t& i: a8 m! c3 C4 _6 Q- D2 Y
    logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
    0 z9 K: P2 n4 v/ Z0 [5 w; j# w6 C5 tproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
    ! B3 x2 N1 \7 {0 [' _2 T9 Z"4 q; ]' K7 [9 e- K
    IIS 4.0 Metabase
    ! A( }0 z& Z( J0 e?Patrick Chambet 1998 - pchambet@club-internet.fr
    ' k4 y: \& w: R6 V, |* I/ H--- UNC User ---# _3 S) [2 b6 q- e" I
    UNC User name: 'Lou'1 d1 X8 N7 v# b5 S
    UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
    0 h2 |/ m8 k* \3 \! a6 a5 `UNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False', ?- F( ]* l9 ~
    --- Anonymous User ---1 g4 G4 X: P. n2 J
    Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'. t4 I$ _8 O, L9 Y
    Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
    - L+ U. B' u) l% W5 l" ]Password synchronization: 'False'0 c  }5 {% v8 w& Z0 |. a+ L) {
    --- IIS Logs DSN User ---
    - c0 S- f# B) e! f. }ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'1 b4 L) P5 H. I! O: z- }
    ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
    ) v' Y% j6 W0 M& A9 D6 ~5 zODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'1 m6 B9 F8 D, U1 r  _
    ODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'+ [, ^6 x& {9 [2 [2 z) c
    --- Web Applications User ---
    + x; L8 m) q$ s: zWAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'3 {0 S2 P. V9 m3 Z# K
    WAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'# ^( u, O2 x2 w0 g0 p0 d0 {. s  s
    Default Logon Domain: ''
    2 d- h2 ?- E: x" e"  J+ k/ @3 m* T; I3 |# B- {
    For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
    . f( H; s, L0 P) [& S0 MA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
    ! \  _; P6 u" M% p' v- sserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example% l3 y9 x' U, B
    an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
    * H3 ?- d: r# J$ Y9 X# `the login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual% [( H4 g& E# d$ O! A
    directory located on another server, say (b).
    ! I1 [3 P3 t* O8 X, hNow, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
    - {( L; S2 ~* t1 CAnd so forth...# b% U7 N# Q: j" v8 d8 J$ }
    Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.
    . O; n9 H5 Z/ I" g_______________________________________________________________________* d% k2 O2 V# L6 \  d- _2 c. \
    Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
    6 ^* y0 r5 x; l3 v8 yMCP NT 4.0, s' _# O! S/ q
    Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions1 T8 S* ~7 L4 f& e9 w, O7 M9 o6 ^
    e-business Services) H- _( }8 X5 J8 Q' W
    IBM Global Services
    . b/ i# s3 ^; Y0 E
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