NT的密碼究竟放在哪

根據(jù)以前的發(fā)現(xiàn),windowsNT密碼雖然不象Windows95那樣以簡單加密形式包含在一個(gè)文件里面,而是一些雜亂的暗碼,分別藏在7個(gè)不同的地方。這篇最新發(fā)表的文章告訴我們WindowsNT密碼隱藏的第八個(gè)地方。Date: Mon, 22 Feb 1999 11:26:41 +0100
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From: Patrick CHAMBET <pchambet@club-internet.fr>
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To: sans@clark.net
Subject: Alert: IIS 4.0 metabase can reveal plaintext passwords
Hi all,
We knew that Windows NT passwords are stored in 7 different places across
the system. Here is a 8th place: the IIS 4.0 metabase.
IIS 4.0 uses its own configuration database, named "metabase", which can
be compared to the Windows Registry: the metabase is organised in Hives,
  M+ v$ L% q) KKeys and Values. It is stored in the following file:
! \" |9 {& Q6 X$ L; P( DC:\WINNT\system32\inetsrv\MetaBase.bin
& [/ c0 D1 Y1 z/ x4 m. rThe IIS 4.0 metabase contains these passwords:
- IUSR_ComputerName account password (only if you have typed it in the
MMC)
- IWAM_ComputerName account password (ALWAYS !)
- UNC username and password used to connect to another server if one of
your virtual directories is located there.
- The user name and password used to connect to the ODBC DSN called
+ X% {( {9 o! m0 K& a/ I* P* N"HTTPLOG" (if you chose to store your Logs into a database).
Note that the usernames are in unicode, clear text, that the passwords are
. f) p. q" @' b" x* R& F$ o' Z7 bsrambled in the metabase.ini file, and that only Administrators and SYSTEM
have permissions on this file.
1 {# z4 ^$ s$ D) uBUT a few lines of script in a WSH script or in an ASP page allow to print
these passwords in CLEAR TEXT.
The user name and password used to connect to the Logs DSN could allow a
malicious user to delete traces of his activities on the server.
& X$ @% Q4 Y" Q& k' Z2 n" jObviously this represents a significant risk for Web servers that allow
logons and/or remote access, although I did not see any exploit of the
& y2 p3 I5 d3 R3 tproblem I am reporting yet. Here is an example of what can be gathered:
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IIS 4.0 Metabase
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9 ?2 v: Q) `9 I1 ^! r--- UNC User ---
4 Z% j  |- l2 R5 rUNC User name: 'Lou'
UNC User password: 'Microsoft'
" P& g8 X) k* m' g: t" ZUNC Authentication Pass Through: 'False'
--- Anonymous User ---
Anonymous User name: 'IUSR_SERVER'
Anonymous User password: 'x1fj5h_iopNNsp'
9 F# u. _; k0 g- z) OPassword synchronization: 'False'
--- IIS Logs DSN User ---
ODBC DSN name: 'HTTPLOG'
) ]$ E) j5 j; D/ l! |. Z+ x- T5 l5 _ODBC table name: 'InternetLog'
ODBC User name: 'InternetAdmin'
  H2 a  M$ P/ f$ A2 LODBC User password: 'xxxxxx'
--- Web Applications User ---
. n# m! M1 |* x2 i& M* pWAM User name: 'IWAM_SERVER'
8 Y5 u% i/ J7 \1 s1 QWAM User password: 'Aj8_g2sAhjlk2'
: \" V5 f; A8 q! ]  \5 W1 BDefault Logon Domain: ''
"
For example, you can imagine the following scenario:
$ Z. \  e! Q( D/ z1 n$ UA user Bob is allowed to logon only on a server hosting IIS 4.0, say
* N/ X& P7 n% r* ^; q  o7 ]* J7 [. bserver (a). He need not to be an Administrator. He can be for example
an IIS 4.0 Web Site Operator. Then, he launches a WSH script that extracts
' h2 ^+ t  S2 Q$ l( R# Bthe login name and password of the account used to access to a virtual
- G4 p' X& F& O% mdirectory located on another server, say (b).
" W" `5 J6 s& V1 NNow, Bob can use these login name and passord to logon on server (b).
And so forth...
Microsoft was informed of this vulnerability.
" P7 Y6 C5 c; j9 d; t_______________________________________________________________________
Patrick CHAMBET - pchambet@club-internet.fr
MCP NT 4.0
Internet, Security and Microsoft solutions
e-business Services
IBM Global Services
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